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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LARSON FORD SALES, INC., ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) 
-vs- ) 
J. TAYLOR SILVER, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Case No. 14391 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT 
COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE BRYANT H. CROFT, JUDGE, 
PRESIDING. 
NATURE OF CASE 
This appeal involves the validity of Section 78-6-10 
of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), which requires a defendant 
who is dissatisfied with a Judgment rendered against him in 
Small Claims Court to appeal that Judgment within five (5) days 
from the entry thereof to the District Court of the county in 
which said court is held. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On August 5, 1974, the defendant appealed from an 
adverse decision entered on July 11, 1974, by the Honorable LeRoy 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
H. Griffiths, Judge of the Small Claims Court of Murray City, Utah, 
to the Third Judicial District Court of the County of Salt Lake. 
On December 15, 1975, on motion of plaintiff, the Honorable Bryant 
H. Croft, Judge of the District Court for Salt Lake County, dis-
missed the appeal of defendant, J. Taylor Silver, pursuant to 
Section 78-6-10 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), on the 
grounds that the appeal was not taken timely. Plaintiff admits 
that Gordon Esplin appeared on behalf of the defendant at the 
Hearing on December 15, 1975, and that arguments were heard by 
the Court. Plaintiff apologizes for the clerical error in stat-
ing that no one appeared on behalf of defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant appeals on the law only, requesting a 
determination as to the validity of Section 78-6-10 of the Utah 
Code Annotated ,(1953) , and seeks the court to overrule the deci-
sion of the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By Affidavit dated June 5, 1974, plaintiff filed suit 
in the Small Claims Court of Murray City, Utah, to recover $197.66, 
from J. Taylor Silver, a Utah resident, for parts and services 
used in repairing his car (R. 4). Trial was held before the 
Honorable LeRoy H. Griffiths, Judge of the Small Claims Court of 
Murray City on July 11, 1974, and Judgment was entered against J. 
Taylor Silver and in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $106.23. 
On August 5, 1974, twenty-five (25) days after the Judgment was 
rendered in Small Claims Court, J. Taylor Silver obtained counsel 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and filed a Notice of Appeal with Murray City Court (R. 3). 
Defendant's counsel also filed a motion pursuant to Rule 73(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requesting that defendant 
be allowed to appeal without posting bond, on the grounds that 
defendant was not financially able to afford a bond, and was 
only able to pay the filing fees, (R. 8-9). Said Motion was 
granted, ex parte, on the 6th day of August, 1974, and plaintiff 
did not object to said Motion. On December 3, 1975, plaintiff 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the defendant's appeal in the District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the grounds and 
for the reasons that Section 78-6-10 of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) requires that an appeal from Small Claims Court be made 
within five (5) days from the entry of Judgment, and that the 
appeal in this case had not been taken until twenty-five (25) 
days after entry of Judgment (R. 15). Plaintiff's Motion to 
Dismiss was heard on Monday, December 15, 1975, at the hour of 
2:00 P.M., before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge of the 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. At that 
time, the Court heard arguments of John L. McCoy representing 
the plaintiff and Gordon F. Esplin representing the defendant, 
and the Court thereafter entered its Order dismissing the appeal 
of J. Taylor Silver as requested in the Motion of plaintiff. 
Thereafter, plaintiff filed his appeal with this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PURPOSE OF SMALL CLAIMS COURT IS TO AFFORD 
THE SMALL CLAIMANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK LEGAL 
SATISFACTION UNENCUMBERED BY THE EXPENSES AND 
DELAY USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH LITIGATION. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Small Claims Courts are a common part of the court 
system and are present in almost every American Jurisdiction. 
e.g. Cal. Civil Proc. Code, § 117 et seq. (West 1954); Idaho 
Code § 1-2301 et seq. These Courts were established to provide 
small claims litigants with speedy, low cost hearings, by employ-
ing a procedure designed to minimize the technicalities normally 
confronting the parties involved in a legal dispute. This con-
cept benefits persons of all socio-economic levels by reducing 
the time and expense involved in litigation. Attorneys are not 
needed (and in some states even forbidden: e.g., Cal Civil Pro. 
Code § 117g; Idaho Code § 1-2308) and courtroom procedure is 
informal. Access to the courts is thereby made readily avail-
able to people who would normally be discouraged by the expense 
and formality of a lawsuit. More people are allowed their day 
in court with no abandonment of the rules of substantive law. 
The courts also benefit from this type of system with a reduced 
caseload. .A maximum number of cases can be adjudicated in a 
minimum amount of time without overloading the court system or 
prolonging a remedy to the parties. One of the procedural aspects 
which the Legislature had to determine when establishing Small 
Claims Court was the mode of appeal. The Utah Legislature deter-
mined that five (5) days was the most appropriate and beneficial 
amount of time to be allowed for an appeal while furthering the 
goals of the Small Claims Court. Section 78-6-10, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). Contrary to appellant's contentions, five (5) 
days does not deny a defendant access to the courts, but simply 
requires that he exercise his appeal option within the prescribed 
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five-day period so that the case may be disposed of judiciously. 
Furthermore, Section 78-6-10 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
denies the plaintiff an appeal under any circumstances unless 
a counterclaim has been interposed by defendant. Therefore, in 
the interest of speedy and judicious treatment of small claims 
matters, the Legislature saw fit to facilitate this type of 
court system by restricting the mode of appeal of all small 
claimants. Nor is the five-day-appeal provision unreasonable 
since it applies equally to all small claimants equally situated 
within the State of Utah. As the court said in Rinaldi v. 
Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 15 LEd2d 477, 86 S.Ct. 1947, which is 
cited in appellant's Brief, "Once the avenues to appellate 
review are established, they must be kept free of unreasonable 
distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the 
courts.11 This case stands for the principle that once an appeal 
procedure has been established, it must be kept open and 
equally accessible to all people who come within its confines. 
In the present case, the appellant was not treated differently 
from any other small claims court defendant and was equally 
afforded the "avenue" of appellant review set forth in Section 
78-6-10 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN APPEAL 
FROM SMALL CLAIMS COURT 
Section 9, Article 8 of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah provides a right of appeal from final judgments of 
District and Justice's Courts under those conditions provided 
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by law. However, this provision does not apply to Small Claims 
Court, and in the absence of Constitutional or Statutory provi-
sion granting a right to appeal, due process and equal protection 
are not violated by the absence or restriction of an appeal privi-
lege. Patterich v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 107 Ut. 55, 
145 P2d 502 (1944); Skaggs v. Small Claims Court for 
Los Angeles Judicial District of Los Angeles County, 68 C2d 76, 
435 P2d 825 (1968). Small Claims Court is not a court contemplated 
by the Constitution and is strictly a creature of Statute, entitled 
only to those rights provided by law. ' • • • • . " -
POINT III 
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IS NOT DENIED 
BY THE APPLICATION OF A SPECIFIC COURSE OF 
PROCEDURE TO LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH A 
. PARTICULAR PERSON IS AFFECTED, WHEN SUCH A ;. 
COURSE IS ALSO APPLIED TO ANY OTHER PERSON 
IN THE STATE UNDER SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES 
AND CONDITIONS. 
Equal protection of the laws is denied only if a 
statute does not provide equal access to the court by imposing 
a rule which does not apply equally to all persons invoking the 
same kinds of claims and rights. In the case of Utah small 
claimants, all defendants are provided the same right of access 
to the courts. Five (5) days is allowed to each and every small 
claims defendant, with no variation in treatment made amongst 
the class. In the case of Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 
25 LEd 987 (1946), it was held that equal protection of the laws 
in respect to legal proceedings does not required that every per-
son in the land shall possess the same rights and privileges of 
every other person, and does not forbid proper and reasonable 
classification in the field of court proceedings. See also Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Salzburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954); State v. Phillips, 
540 P2d 943 (1975). Small Claims Court is exactly that, a 
reasonable classification designed to treat a specific type of 
person or litigant. Equal protection of the law regarding appeals 
implies only that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to 
the courts under like conditions, with like protections and with-
out discrimination. It is a well-settled rule that a state may 
classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislations, 
and may pass laws applicable only to persons or objects within 
a designated class. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 86 LEd 
1655, 62 S.Ct. 1110. 
POINT IV 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE DOES NOT EXACT 
UNIFORMITY OF PROCEDURE, AND THE LEGISLATURE 
MAY REASONABLY CLASSIFY LITIGATION AND ADOPT 
ONE TYPE OF PROCEDURE FOR ONE CLASS AND A 
DIFFERENT TYPE FOR ANOTHER. 
This point is set forth in the case of Dohany v. 
Rodgers, 281 U.S. 362, 74 LEd. (Adv. 365), 50 S.Ct.Rep. 299, 
68 ALR 434, 441, where the Court stated that "the due process 
clause does not guarantee to the citizen of a state any parti-
cular form or method of state procedure. Under it he may neither 
claim a right to trial by jury nor a right of appeal. Its re-
quirements are satisfied if he has reasonable notice and reason-
able opportunity to be heard and to present his claim or defense, 
due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding and the 
character of the rights which may be effected by it." "Nor does 
the equal protection clause exact uniformity of procedure. The 
legislature may classify litigation and adopt one type of pro-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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cedure for one class and a different type for another." As pre-
viously mentioned, Section 78-6-10 of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) does not allow the plaintiff to appeal unless a counter-
claim has been interposed. The defendant, on the other hand, is 
given a right of appeal which must be exercised within five (5) 
days . 
Plaintiff believes that the cases of Boddie v. Connec-
ticut, 401 U.S. 371, 28 LEd2d 113, 91 S.Ct. 780 (1971); Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 100 LEd 891, 76 S.Ct. 585; and Douglas 
v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9^LEd2d 811 (1963), 
cited in appellant's Brief are not applicable to the issues 
raised by this appeal. Those cases involved indigents who, 
because of their poverty, could not avail themselves of redress 
in the courts on a level equal, to that of wealthier persons. 
Those cases, dealt with discrimination between the rich and the 
poor. The Small Claims Court System, however, is the exact 
opposite, with one of its prime benefits being to provide all 
persons, rich or poor, with access to the courts quickly and at 
a minimum expense. There is no question that the appellant, J. 
Taylor Silver, should have access to the courts. In this case 
he was the defendant and did not initiate court action, but he 
was provided with an additional benefit not afforded the plain-
tiff, that being the right to appeal from an adverse decision. 
J. Taylor Silver was allowed the same procedural rights as all 
other persons within the State of Utah equally situated. His 
right to appeal from Small Claims Court to District Court was 
not impeded in any manner, and he simply failed to exercise his 
option promptly as required by the law. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Appellant sets forth in his Brief the rational rela-
tion requirement of equal protection. The three main elements 
of this analysis, as set forth by appellant, are the purpose of 
the law, the reasonableness of the classification as it relates 
to the law, and the reasonableness of the effect of the law. 
Plaintiff believes that the entire Small Claims, Court Act must 
be considered in applying this analysis to the present case. 
The purpose of the law is, first, to provide a means of expedi-
tious treatment for small matters which, because of their 
nominal value, would foreclose the possibility of suit if it 
was necessary to engage counsel or become involved in lengthy 
court proceedings, and second, to help alleviate the caseload 
burden that the City and District Courts face. The classifi-
cation consists of setting apart those persons engaged in dis-
putes which involve $200.00 or less, and establishing procedural 
rules to govern their court proceedings. These rules necessar-
ily set forth what, if any, is the mode of appeal. In this 
case, the defendant is given five (5) days to appeal, and the 
plaintiff is given an appeal only if he is ruled against on a 
counterclaim. The very real effect of this law is to treat 
small matters quickly and judiciously, with an equal opportun-
ity afforded each small claimant to have his day in court and 
with exact procedural guidelines applied equally to all members 
of the class. The limited appeal privileges help attain this 
result. 
On Page 7 of appellant's Brief he lists certain prac-
ticalities which the Court should consider in determining the 
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reasonableness of the classification for equal protection pur-
poses. However, plaintiff believes that there are other prac-
ticalities which the defendant overlooked including the follow-
ing: 
(a) The burden which would exist on the courts if 
all matters and claims under $200.00 were added to the City or 
District Court caseload. 
(b) The appropriateness of a system which allows 
persons to resolve minor disputes on their own without additional 
legal expenses or long court delays. (In fact, the Small Claims 
Court System favors poor claimants, as in this case.) 
Also, it appears to respondent that the arguments set 
forth in Section 6 on Page 7 of appellants Brief regarding short 
time are not applicable in this case. Both cases cited by appel-
lant regard non-residents who are required, within short time 
periods, ten days in one case and five in another, to answer to 
the courts of another state. In addition, the Utah Supreme Court 
in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Ut2d 492, P2d 1335 (1971), held 
that a plaintiff was not deprived of equal protection of the laws 
by a statute that required notice of a claim for damages or injury 
against a city be given to the Board of Commissioners or City 
Council of such city within thirty (30) days of the happening of 
the injury or damages. Section 10-7-77 of the Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953). This Statute effectively shortened the time that 
a person would normally have in initiating an action in tort. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 78-6-10"of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
establishes a proper classification which treats all persons Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
— II — 
within the class equally and is in total agreement with the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the United States 
and the State of Utah. There is neither a suspect criteria 
involved here, such as race, nationality or alienage, nor a 
fundamental First Amendment right requiring a compelling govern-
mental interest before it may be significantly regulated. 
Therefore, the legislation involved here need only have a ra-
tional justification for its existence. Flemming v. Nestor, 
363 U.S. 603. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RYBERG & McCOY 
Richard B. Cuatto 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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